In general, independent regulatory commissions are created primarily for the purpose of

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journal article

VI. The Regulatory Commissions Revisited

The American Political Science Review

Vol. 43, No. 5 (Oct., 1949)

, pp. 978-989 (12 pages)

Published By: American Political Science Association

https://doi.org/10.2307/1950239

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1950239

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Journal Information

The American Political Science Review (APSR) is the longest running publication of the American Political Science Association (APSA). APSR, first published in November 1906 and appearing quarterly, is the preeminent political science journal in the United States and internationally. APSR features research from all fields of political science and contains an extensive book review section of the discipline. In its earlier days, APSR also covered the personal and personnel items of the profession as had its predecessor, the Proceedings of the APSA.

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Founded in 1903, the American Political Science Association is the major professional society for individuals engaged in the study of politics and government. APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors. While most APSA members are scholars who teach and conduct research in colleges and universities in the U.S. and abroad, one-fourth work outside academe in government, research, organizations, consulting firms, the news media, and private enterprise. For more information about the APSA, its publications and programs, please see the APSA website.

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journal article

THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE: IRCs OR DRAs?

Southern Review of Public Administration

Vol. 3, No. 4 (MARCH 1980)

, pp. 427-443 (17 pages)

Published By: SPAEF

https://www.jstor.org/stable/43865942

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The Southern Public Administration Education Foundation, Inc. (SPAEF) is located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The SPAEF's purpose is to develop and to disseminate information in the fields of public administration and management.

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What is the main purpose of the independent regulatory commissions?

Independent regulatory agencies are federal agencies created by an act of Congress that are independent of the executive departments. Though they are considered part of the executive branch, these agencies are meant to impose and enforce regulations free of political influence.

How are independent regulatory agencies created?

To create an independent agency, Congress passes a statute granting an agency the authority to regulate and control a specific area or industry.

What are independent regulatory agencies and commissions?

The term 'independent regulatory agency' means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal ...

Why did Congress establish regulatory commissions quizlet?

Why did Congress initially create independent regulatory commissions such as the Interstate Commerce Commission? To regulate specific economic interests. The Hatch Act regulates: The political activity of government employees.