Presidential appointees to which type of federal agency will likely have the most influence?

journal article

Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan's Executive Branch

Public Administration Review

Vol. 57, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1997)

, pp. 75-82 (8 pages)

Published By: Wiley

https://doi.org/10.2307/976694

https://www.jstor.org/stable/976694

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Abstract

How did career executives think influence was distributed in their agencies during the Reagan administration? Who would top bureaucrats have preferred to exercise influence? Which actors did career executives believe had too much influence and which too little? This article investigates the attitudes of a sample of career members of the senior executive service regarding these questions. The dominant view of presidential-bureaucratic relations in the public administration literature emphasizes the influence exercised by bureaucrats, key members of Congress, and representatives of interest groups at the expense of hierarchical guidance by agents of the president. The findings reported here suggest that top bureaucrats (1) thought that political appointees were very influential in their agencies and, (2) wanted more influence to be exercised by key political executives. The Reagan team's administrative strategy was apparently successful in gaining the support of top members of the higher civil service.

Journal Information

Public Administration Review has been the premier journal in the field of public administration research and theory for more than 75 years, and is the only journal in public administration that serves academics, practitioners, and students interested in the public sector and public sector management. Articles identify and analyze current trends, provide a factual basis for decision making, stimulate discussion, and make the leading literature in the field available in an easily accessible format.

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Public Administration Review © 1997 American Society for Public Administration
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How does the president influence the bureaucracy?

The president influences control over the bureaucracy by: appointing agency directors and subheads (with Senate approval) issuing executive orders compelling an agency to do/not do something. increasing or decreasing an agency's budget (through the Office of Management and Budget)

Who has the most control over the bureaucracy?

Most directly, the president controls the bureaucracies by appointing the heads of the fifteen cabinet departments and of many independent executive agencies, such as the CIA, the EPA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

How does Congress influence the bureaucracy?

Congressional bureaucratic influence results from legislative and investigative oversight functions, personnel selection and staffing, and the budget. The public, especially professional associations and individual policy experts, exercises a great deal of influence over the Federal bureaucracy.

How do federal presidential appointees differ from employees within the civil service system quizlet?

How do federal presidential appointees differ from employees within the civil service system? Correct: - Federal presidential appointees can be members of the Senior Executive Service. - Federal presidential appointees make up the top leadership positions of most cabinet departments.