Bagehot described the Crown’s role in England in the following classic statement: Show
To state the matter shortly, the sovereign has, under a constitutional monarchy such as ours, three rights—the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn.[30] In Australia, for all practical purposes, it is the Constitution which determines the nature and the exercise of the Governor-General’s powers and functions. In essence these powers can be divided into three groups—prerogative, legislative and executive. Prerogative powersAlthough since Federation it has been an established principle that the Governor-General in exercising the powers and functions of the office should only do so with the advice of his or her Ministers of State, the principle has not always been followed. This principle of responsible government is discussed further in the Chapter on ‘House, Government and Opposition’. The Constitution provides definite and limited powers, although in some cases the ways in which these powers may be exercised are not specified. The identification and range of prerogative powers are somewhat uncertain and have on occasions resulted in varying degrees of political and public controversy. Quick and Garran defines prerogative powers as:
To some extent this definition may be regarded as redundant or superfluous in modern times. However, the fact that the Constitution states, in some of its provisions, that the Governor-General may perform certain acts without any explicit qualification, while other provisions state that the Governor-General shall act ‘in Council’, suggests an element of discretion in exercising certain functions—that is, those in the first category. Quick and Garran states:
Modern references relating to the prerogative or discretionary powers of the Governor-General clarify this view in the interests of perspective. Sir Paul Hasluck made the following observations in a lecture given during his term as Governor-General:
On 12 November 1975, following the dismissal of Prime Minister Whitlam, Speaker Scholes wrote to the Queen asking her to intervene and restore Mr Whitlam to office as Prime Minister in accordance with the expressed resolution of the House the previous day.[37] On 17 November, the Queen’s Private Secretary, at the command of Her Majesty, replied, in part:
Other than by recording the foregoing statements and discussing the question of dissolution (see below), it is not the intention of this text to detail the various constitutional interpretations as to the Governor-General’s discretionary powers. Based on informed opinion, the exercise of discretionary power by the Governor-General can be interpreted and regarded as conditional upon the following principal factors:
DissolutionThe act of dissolution puts to an end at the same time the duration of the House of Representatives and ipso facto the term of the Parliament.[39] This alone means that the question of dissolution and how the power of dissolution is exercised is of considerable parliamentary importance because of the degree of uncertainty as to when and on what grounds dissolution may occur.[40] The critical provision of the Constitution, in so far as its intention is concerned, is found in the words of section 28 ‘Every House of Representatives shall continue for three years from the first meeting of the House, and no longer’[41] to which is added the proviso ‘but may be sooner dissolved by the Governor-General’. The actual source of the Governor-General’s power to dissolve is found in section 5, the effect and relevant words of which are that ‘The Governor-General may … by Proclamation or otherwise … dissolve the House of Representatives’. While the Constitution vests in the Governor-General the power to dissolve the House, the criteria for taking this action are not prescribed and, therefore, they are matters generally governed by constitutional convention. In a real sense the exercise of the Crown’s power of dissolution is central to an understanding of prerogative powers and the nature of constitutional conventions. As described earlier in this chapter, while it is the prerogative of the Crown to dissolve the House of Representatives, the exercise of the power is subject to the constitutional convention that it does so only on the advice and approval of a Minister of State, in practice the Prime Minister, directly responsible to the House of Representatives. The granting of dissolution is an executive act, the ministerial responsibility for which can be easily established.[42] The nature of the power to dissolve and some of the historical principles, according to which the discretion is exercised, are illustrated by the following authoritative statements:
It is clear that it is incumbent on the Prime Minister to establish sufficient grounds for the need for dissolution, particularly when the House is not near the end of its three year term. The Governor-General makes a judgment on the sufficiency of the grounds. It is in this situation where it is generally recognised that the Governor-General may exercise a discretion not to accept the advice given.[46] The grounds on which the Governor-General has accepted advice to dissolve the House of Representatives have not always been made public. It is reasonable to presume that no special reasons may be given to the Governor-General, or indeed are necessary, for a dissolution of the House if the House is near the end of its three year term.[47] Table 1.1 Early dissolutions of the House of Representatives
(a)A dissolution of the House of Representatives is counted here as ‘early’ if the dissolution occurs six months or more before the date the House of Representatives is scheduled to expire by effluxion of time. The table does not include simultaneous dissolutions of both Houses granted by the Governor-General under s. 57 of the Constitution (see Ch. on ‘Double dissolutions and joint sittings’). (b) The reasons stated in the table may not be the only reasons advised or upon which dissolution was exclusively granted. On four occasions reasons, if any, were not given to the House—for example, the House may not have been sitting at the time. As far as is known, the majority of dissolutions have taken place in circumstances which presented no special features. Where necessary, it is a normal feature for the Governor-General to grant a dissolution on the condition and assurance that adequate provision, that is, parliamentary appropriation, is made for the Administration in all its branches to be carried on until the new Parliament meets.[48] The precedents in Table 1.1 represent those ‘early’ dissolutions where the grounds, available from the public record, were sufficient for the Governor-General to grant a request for a dissolution. A feature of the precedents is that in 1917, 1955, 1977 and 1984 the grounds given included a perceived need to synchronise the election of the House of Representatives with a periodic election for half the Senate. New Government commissioned without dissolutionAdvice to dissolve not acceptedThe Governor-General is known to have refused to accept advice to grant a dissolution on three occasions:[49]
The advice of Prime Minister Fisher in the 1909 case consisted of a lengthy Cabinet minute which contained the following summary of reasons:
The advice went on to state that ‘All these conditions, any one of which is held to justify a dissolution, unite in the present instance.’ According to Crisp ‘The Governor-General was unmoved by considerations beyond "the parliamentary situation"’.[58] Evatt offers the view that ‘certainly the action of the Governor-General proceeded upon a principle which was not out of accord with what had until then been accepted as Australian practice, although the discretion may not have been wisely exercised’.[59] No advice to dissolveOn 10 January 1918, following the defeat of a national referendum relating to compulsory military service overseas, Prime Minister Hughes informed the House that the Government had considered it its duty to resign unconditionally and to offer no advice to the Governor-General. A memorandum from the Governor-General setting out his views was tabled in the House:
A further case which requires brief mention is that of Prime Minister Fadden who resigned following a defeat in the House on 3 October 1941. According to Crisp the Prime Minister ‘apparently relieved the Governor-General from determining the issue involved in the request of a defeated Prime Minister by advising him, not a dissolution, but sending for the Leader of the Opposition, Curtin’.[61] Simultaneous dissolution of both HousesIn specific circumstances set out in section 57 of the Constitution, following continued disagreement between the Senate and the House of Representatives over legislation, the Governor-General may dissolve both Houses simultaneously. This subject is covered in detail in the Chapter on ‘Double dissolutions and joint sittings’. Functions in relation to the ParliamentThe functions of the Governor-General in relation to the legislature are discussed in more detail elsewhere in the appropriate parts of the text. In summary the Governor-General’s constitutional duties (excluding functions of purely Senate application) are:
The Crown in its relations with the legislature is characterised by formality, ceremony and tradition. For example, tradition dictates that the Sovereign should not enter the House of Representatives. Traditionally the Mace is not taken into the presence of the Crown. It is the practice of the House to agree to a condolence motion on the death of a former Governor-General,[62] but on recent occasions the House has not usually followed the former practice of suspending the sitting until a later hour as a mark of respect.[63] In the case of the death of a Governor-General in office the sitting of the House has been adjourned as a mark of respect.[64] An Address to the Queen has been agreed to on the death of a former Governor-General who was a member of the Royal Family,[65] and references have been made to the death of a Governor-General’s close relative.[66] During debate in the House no Member may use the name of the Queen, the Governor-General (or a State Governor) disrespectfully, or for the purpose of influencing the House in its deliberations.[67] The practice of the House is that, unless the discussion is based upon a substantive motion which admits of a distinct vote of the House, reflections (opprobrious references) must not be cast in debate concerning the conduct of the Sovereign or the Governor-General, including a Governor-General designate. It is acceptable for a Minister to be questioned, without criticism or reflection on conduct, regarding matters relating to the public duties for which the Governor-General is responsible. (For more detail and related rulings see Chapters on ‘Control and conduct of debate’ and ‘Questions’.) Functions in relation to the Executive GovernmentThe executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen, and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative,[68] the Queen’s role being essentially one of name only. Section 61 of the Constitution states two principal elements of executive power which the Governor-General exercises, namely, the execution and maintenance of the Constitution, and the execution and maintenance of the laws passed (by the Parliament) in accordance with the Constitution. The Constitution, however, immediately provides that in the government of the Commonwealth, the Governor-General is advised by a Federal Executive Council,[69] effecting the concept of responsible government. The Governor-General therefore does not perform executive acts alone but ‘in Council’, that is, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.[70] The practical effect of this is, as stated in Quick and Garran: … that the Executive power is placed in the hands of a Parliamentary Committee, called the Cabinet, and the real head of the Executive is not the Queen but the Chairman of the Cabinet, or in other words the Prime Minister.[71] Where the Constitution prescribes that the Governor-General (without reference to ‘in Council’) may perform certain acts, it can be said that these acts are also performed in practice with the advice of the Federal Executive Council in all but exceptional circumstances. As Head of the Executive Government,[72] in pursuance of the broad scope of power contained in section 61, the constitutional functions of the Governor-General, excluding those of historical interest, are summarised as follows:
Functions in relation to the JudiciaryThe judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in the High Court of Australia, and such other federal courts that the Parliament creates or other courts it invests with federal jurisdiction.[73] The judiciary is the third element of government in the tripartite division of Commonwealth powers. The Governor-General is specifically included as a constituent part of the legislative and executive organs of power but is not part of the judiciary. While the legislature and the Executive Government have common elements which tend to fuse their respective roles, the judiciary is essentially independent. Nevertheless in terms of its composition it has a relationship to the executive branch (the Governor-General in Council) and is answerable in certain circumstances to the Parliament. The Governor-General in Council appoints justices of the High Court, and of other federal courts created by Parliament. Justices may only be removed by the Governor-General in Council on an address from both Houses praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.[74] See also ‘The Courts and Parliament’ at page 18. Which of the following would be a military power of the governor?GOVERNOR AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF MILITARY FORCES. He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the State, except when they are called into actual service of the United States. He shall have power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the State, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions.
What is the most important power of the governor?Veto Power
All 50 state Governors have the power to veto whole legislative measures. In a large majority of states, a bill will become law unless it is vetoed by the Governor within a specified number of days, which vary among states.
Which of the following is the best example of the Texas governor's military powers?Unit 2. Which of the following is one of the governor's formal powers?The ability to veto legislation is just one of the formal powers governors have at their disposal. Formal powers are powers the governor may exercise that are specifically outlined in state constitutions or state law.
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