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What is partisan polarization quizlet?Partisan Polarization. Political polarization refers to cases in which an individual's stance on a given issue, policy, or person is more likely to be strictly defined by their identification with a particular political party.
What is partisan polarization advantages quizlet?What are the positives and negatives of partisan polarization? A positive is that voters get choices, but a negative is that moderates aren't voting or participating.
What partisan politics mean?A partisan is a committed member of a political party or army. In multi-party systems, the term is used for persons who strongly support their party's policies and are reluctant to compromise with political opponents. A political partisan is not to be confused with a military partisan.
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Partisan polarization makes it difficult to get legislation passed in the legislature true or false
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